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Bioterrorism has become increasingly salient in security discourse in part because of perceived
changes in the capacity and geography of life science research. Yet its salience is founded upon a
framing of changes in science and security that does not always take into consideration the
somewhat slippery concept of ‘tacit knowledge’, something poorly understood, disparately
conceptualised and often marginalised in discussions on state and non-state biological
weapons programmes. This paper looks at how changes in science and technology—particularly
the evolution of information and communications technology—has contributed to the partial
erosion of aspects of tacit knowledge and the implications for the biological weapons regime.
This paper concludes by arguing that the marginalisation of tacit knowledge weakens our
understanding of the difficulties encountered in biological weapons programmes and can result
in distorted perceptions of the threat posed by dual-use biotechnology in the 21st century.
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1. Introduction
Bioterrorism has become increasingly salient in the security
discourse over the last decade partly as a result of the con-
ﬂuence of two events: the attacks of September the 11th and
the subsequent anthrax letter attacks. Yet its growing
salience can also be attributed to a compelling narrative—
premised on the idea that biology and related disciplines
are becoming ‘easier’, more predictable andmore prevalent
around the globe—in which bioterrorism is somehow inev-
itable. Thus, against a backdrop of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor
2006), asymmetrical conﬂicts and terrorism, a combination
of advances in technologies that purport to ‘deskill’ biolo-
gical research (such as DNA synthesis machines) and allow
greater access to information on the life sciences (including
genome information) and a propagation of expertise,
are seen to be dramatically increasing the likelihood of
bioterrorism (Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism 2008; Toole 2011).
There are a number of manifestations of this narra-
tive, for example the Chinese National Science and
Technology Review Paper submitted to the Seventh
Review Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) stated:
Developments in biotechnology have come within the reach of
some groups and even individuals, and some non-State actors
have become more capable of malevolently causing disease,
putting international security under great threat. Terrorist
groups are improving their mastery of sophisticated biotech-
nology. With the spread of synthetic biology, some small scale
research groups and even some individuals are now able to
make the deadly Ebola and smallpox viruses and even some
viruses against which all drugs are ineffective, thus making it
much harder to counter bioterrorism. Furthermore, it has
become much easier to obtain sensitive information. Using
publicly available DNA sequences, terrorists can quickly
synthesize pathogenic microbes that had previously been
eradicated or give existing ones new pathogenic properties.
And the means of perpetrating a bioterrorist attack have
multiplied. Aerosol and viral vector technology can both be
used to spread biological agents and it is highly likely that
some terrorist groups will use them to mount a biological
attack. (China 2011)
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None of the components that underpin this statement
are necessarily ﬂawed: DNA synthesis is undoubtedly
becoming cheaper and faster (National Research Council
2011; USA 2011); greater amounts of data which could be
pertinent to the development of biological weapons is
becoming increasingly accessible through the internet; and
the life sciences are spreading to the extent that McLeish
and Trapp (2011) have begun to speak of a ‘post prolifer-
ation’ agenda in which the:
. . . life sciences are increasingly globally distributed, with top-
notch research and industrial facilities in many countries
around the globe.
Nevertheless, this framing of the bioterrorism narrative
overlooks the important sociotechnical aspects of biotech-
nology not least of which is the role of tacit knowledge,
which is an important ingredient in ‘success’ in scientiﬁc
research and bioweaponeering alike.
Although there have been a number of permutations in
the selection of agents and delivery mechanisms in past
biological weapons programmes—with more combin-
ations potentially becoming possible in the future—in
most cases bioweaponeers aspiring to move beyond the
crude efforts to spread disease will likely be required to
undertake a number of key steps. Such steps include: ob-
taining the appropriate strain of the pathogen (either by
collecting in nature, acquiring from a laboratory or ‘syn-
thesising’), handling the organism correctly, growing it in
a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics,
storing and scaling up the agent in a stable manner, and
developing a suitable mechanism to disperse the product
properly (Leitenberg 2004). In order to be ‘successfully’
achieved without destroying the pathogen (or person
undertaking these activities), each of these individual
steps are likely to require speciﬁc information, expertise
and ‘know-how’ in varying degrees. Moreover, the cumu-
lative process of obtaining, handling, culturing, scaling
and weaponising an agent is likely to require a broader
and deep ‘end-to-end knowledge of the materials and
processes needed’ (Parachini et al. 2005) and the
capacity to effectively manage the research process and
ensure continuity and complementarity in different phases
of activity.
Historically a number of biological (as well as chemical
and nuclear) weapons programmes are understood to
have stymied or failed to create or optimise effective
weapons in part because of a deﬁcit of ‘know-how’
(Wheelis and Sugishima 2006; Danzig et al. 2012). This
limitation is particularly acute in the weaponisation step
which is notably where a number of authenticated
instances of bioterrorism (Tucker 2000; Danzig et al.
2012) have collapsed or been rendered of limited utility,
leading Vogel (2006) to suggest this step is where:
. . . critical tacit knowledge for bioweapons development
primarily resides.
By weaponisation in this context we are referring to the
process of optimising the delivery of a pathogen in a
manner that effectively generates a signiﬁcant physio-
logical effect commensurate with public perceptions of bio-
logical weapons as having mass destructive effects.
However, the utility of biological weapons is not limited
to mass infectivity per se, and terrorists or state actors
could be attracted to biological weapons for their psycho-
logical effects in order to attract attention, create fear and
undertake economic or political sabotage (Ilchmann and
Revill 2013), objectives that would not necessarily
require optimised weaponisation. The 2013 ricin letters
emailed to President Obama, Sen. Roger Wicker and
Judge Sadie Holland (Lee County, MS) serve to illustrate
this point. There is a long history of crude efforts to mail
ricin and the 2013 letters are believed to contain a ricin
preparation generated through the use of one of a number
of recipes available on the internet. However, such recipes
frequently fail to optimise the use of ricin and overcome
the difﬁcult process of milling the toxin to an optimal
particle size (Barnes 2013; Hayden and Wadman 2013),
instead generating crude unreﬁned preparation of ricin.
As Leitenberg is reported as saying:
You could ingest this crude stuff, swallow a couple of
tablespoons and you’d probably vomit, but not much more.
(Ward 2013)
In the context of weaponisation, tacit knowledge thus
potentially plays an important role as a ‘barrier to
optimising and creating effective bioweapons’ and
warrants further attention, particularly if one is seeking
to make some form of evaluation regarding the extent of
threat posed by a perceived bioweapons program or assess
the implications of advances in science and technology
(S&T). Even where optimised weaponisation is not the
strategic goal, tacit knowledge may be an important
limiting factor in the ability of unskilled actors to exploit
advances in S&T, which has important implications for the
way in which threat is assessed. For example, statements
such as the Chinese National S&T Review Paper (China
2011) highlight a number of assumptions about the threat,
which conﬂate advances in sophisticated techniques
for virus synthesis with increased public access to this
knowledge. However, to neglect tacit knowledge and
conduct an assessment premised solely on material
capacities, such as equipment, facilities and the availability
of codiﬁed information (in for example scientiﬁc journals)
alone, is unlikely to be adequate, as it ignores the very real
and grounded difﬁculties experienced in the process of
doing science; to paraphrase Walker (2012):
. . . actual capabilities at any particular point in time are
perhaps far less advanced than one might assess by looking
in from the outside.
Yet despite its apparent importance, the term tacit
knowledge remains poorly understood, disparately
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conceptualised and often marginalised in discussions on
state and non-state biological weapons programmes and
assessments of S&T (Vogel 2013). Accordingly, this paper
begins by introducing and exploring the concept of tacit
knowledge, drawing from the work of scholars of S&T
studies, but particularly the work of Professor Harry
Collins (2010) who has usefully disaggregated tacit know-
ledge into a three-way classiﬁcation. Using this three-way
classiﬁcation,1 with a minor modiﬁcation to the third
category in order to draw attention to the role of team
work and communally synthesised knowledge, this paper
looks at: weak tacit knowledge, somatic tacit knowledge,
and communal tacit knowledge. Each of these categories
of tacit knowledge is introduced with examples from either
the historical literature on biological weapons programmes
(by State and non-State actors) or in the practice of science
to illustrate the importance of each category in the practise
of bioweaponeering and biology, respectively. The paper
then proceeds to look at the implications of the ongoing
revolution in information and communication technology
(ICT), particularly the use of visualised experimentation
protocols and developments in synthetic biology and the
role these advances could play in the partial erosion of
aspects of tacit knowledge. The paper concludes by
addressing the ‘so what?’ question and looking at the
implications for the biological weapons regime. It argues
that advances in ICT are leading to the partial erosion of
tacit knowledge of relevance to the BWC. In this context,
the paper contends the marginalisation of tacit knowledge
weakens our understanding of the difﬁculties encountered
in biological weapons programmes and can result in
distorted perceptions of the threat posed by dual-use bio-
technology in the 21st century.
2. Tacit knowledge
The concept of tacit knowledge is often understood by
reference to its opposite, that is, explicit, fully articulable
knowledge that can be conveyed from the knower to a
recipient by means of language. In contrast, tacit know-
ledge is commonly perceived as involving a process of
‘learning by example’ or ‘learning by doing’ that can
only be acquired through practical hands-on experience
(Polanyi 1974). One commonly cited example of tacit
knowledge is that of riding a bike, or, more speciﬁcally,
balancing a bike, an act that requires a certain ‘sixth sense’
that becomes natural after time, but is difﬁcult to explain
in real time to someone trying to balance a bike for the ﬁrst
time. As MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995) have stated:
Most of us, for example, know perfectly well how to ride a
bicycle yet would ﬁnd it impossible to put into words how we
do so.
Yet, while perhaps the most obvious element of tacit
knowledge, the bike analogy belies a range of categorically
different types of tacit knowledge that could (and should)
be considered, particularly when examining the role of
tacit knowledge in scientiﬁc practice. It is thus an oversim-
pliﬁcation to view tacit knowledge solely in terms of the
bicycle balancing analogy. Indeed, precisely because differ-
ent understandings of tacit knowledge and ‘tacitness’
confuse the debate on this issue, these different categories
need to be teased out and separated.
Accordingly, three subcategories of tacit knowledge are
outlined and developed in Sections 3–5 using the work of
scholars, such as Collins, who has identiﬁed a number of
different types of tacit knowledge and varying degrees
of ‘tacitness’. While not accepted homogenously across
the S&T studies community where debate continues over
the conceptualisation of tacit knowledge, these categories
of weak tacit knowledge, ‘somatic’ tacit knowledge, and
communal tacit knowledge, are nonetheless a useful frame-
work to elaborate upon the concept of tacit knowledge in
relation to biological weapons and understand the likely
impact of the internet on the spread of types of tacit
knowledge.
3. Weak tacit knowledge
Weak tacit knowledge is that which could, under certain
circumstances, be rendered explicit but either through in-
ability, unwillingness or practicality remains unwritten and
implicit. There are a number of speciﬁc subcomponents of
weak tacit knowledge. Collins (2010) for example, talks of,
inter alia, ‘logistically demanding knowledge’, ‘concealed
knowledge’, ‘ostensive knowledge’, ‘mismatched saliences’
and ‘unrecognised knowledge’.
Concealed knowledge is that which can be ‘conveyed in
a few words’ but is ‘deliberately kept hidden’ (Collins
2010). In the practice of chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear weapons there are likely to be a number of
examples of where competing factions of researchers
engaged in the deliberate stove piping of information and
knowledge. This is perhaps best articulated in the chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) context by Vogel (2006) in
her study of bioweapons proliferation:
Although SNOPB [Scientiﬁc Experimental and Production
Base] did receive several hundred pages of technical documents
involving previous MOD anthrax work, some classiﬁed infor-
mation was not sent to SNOPB. Ken Alibek attributes this to
turf issues and competition between Sverdlovsk, the MOD,
and SNOPB. As a result, this type of intentionally concealed
tacit knowledge . . .would only be conveyed through personal
communication with the original developers of the Anthrax
836 weapon.
Logistically demanding knowledge has been illustrated
using the example of the ‘old warehouseman’, and covers
individuals who knows where everything is and maintain
a mental database of the warehouse contents, yet for prag-
matic reasons of cost/beneﬁts to the business, this infor-
mation is not articulated. Such a concept at ﬁrst may
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appear far removed from the world of CBW, however, in
the process of obtaining agents, for example, logistically
demanding knowledge could be useful and certainly a
RAND study highlighted the role of:
. . . administrative and security personnel who are likely to
possess sensitive information about the facilities or institutes
in which they work. (Parachini et al. 2005)
Indeed, there are a range of aspects of logistically
demanding tacit knowledge that could be employed in
the acquisition of chemical and biological materials,
including: knowledge of security procedures to facilitate
theft; knowledge of customs and/or police procedures;
knowledge of the pharmaceutical sector or other industrial
structures to facilitate purchases of materials and equip-
ment; and a knowledge of ﬁxers and individuals who
can make arrangements and links between sets of people.
None of these is ﬁxedly tacit, on the contrary all these
could be written down. Nor are they sufﬁcient to
generate functioning weapons alone. Yet they are
elements which could facilitate the acquisition of materials
and/or their transfer.
Perhaps of greater signiﬁcance is the concept of osten-
sive tacit knowledge, deﬁned by Collins (2010) as:
. . . knowledge that can be learned only by pointing to some
object or practice because the description in words . . .would be
too complex to be spoken.
Again, the work of Vogel (2006) in relation to bioweapons
proliferation is useful in this regard:
Solving various engineering problems related to the unique
infrastructure at SNOPB involved a trial-and-error process
that deployed knowledge obtained through previous hands-
on experience from working with fermentation, biosafety,
drying, and milling equipment. Again, transfer of the 65
experienced MOD staff likely contributed to deciphering
these types of ostensive tacit knowledge and adapting
existing MOD protocols to work at SNOPB.
Two ﬁnal, closely linked, examples of weak tacit
knowledge identiﬁed by Collins are those of ‘mis-
matched saliences’ and ‘unrecognised knowledge’. In the
case of the mismatched saliences, these are argued to occur
when:
. . . person A, who wants to convey everything they know to
person B, assumes that person B is in possession of some
essential piece of explicable knowledge . . .when in fact they
are not. (Collins 2010: 95)
It is not difﬁcult to imagine how mismatched saliences can
confuse. In the world of biological disarmament diplomacy
mismatched saliences can (and do) occur frequently
through the use of acronyms, the use of which is not a
necessarily a deliberate effort to conceal knowledge, but
rather a shorthand which can become inadvertently
inaccessible to those new to the ﬁeld.
To provide an example, experts in the CBW ﬁeld may
agree or disagree with the suggestion that:
. . . the BWC needs an OPCW style SAB supported by the ISU
and the IAP to build on the new ISP’s S&T SAI discussion in
the MX.
However, most in this small community would be able
to decipher what is being proposed. Yet those outside
would not immediately interpret this as a suggestion
that:
. . . the Biological Weapons Convention needs an Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons style Science
Advisory Board supported by the (BWC) Implementation
Support Unit and the Inter-Academy Panel to build on the
new Inter-Sessional Process’s S&T Standing Agenda Item
discussion in the Meeting of Experts.
The same types of obstacles also apply to biology, as one
introductory guide to biology states:
. . . the biological literature is ﬁlled with acronyms, termin-
ology, jargon, and references to kits and reagents with
obscure trade names. (Nadeau 2012)
The concept of unrecognised knowledge is perhaps of even
greater signiﬁcance and something illustrated with the
seminal tale of the transversely-excited atmospheric-
pressure (TEA) laser, which is worth quoting at length to
illustrate some of the practical challenges posed by unrec-
ognised knowledge:
H knew that the leads from the capacitors to the electrodes had
to be short, and the glass tubes ﬂat, but had not given any
quantitative consideration to these matters . . .These leads were
about eight inches long in the laser as ﬁrst built, which, as H
remarks, is ‘short by any standards’. When H got to Whitehall,
he found that their capacitor leads were considerably shorter
than his, and there was ‘no limit to how short they should be,
just as short as possible’. (Collins 2010)
The examples illustrate an important point on communi-
cation or lack of between disciplines and even within
disciplines wherein speciﬁc communities develop their
own dialects:
. . . loaded with arcane terminology, acronyms and tribal
jargon that bind members of one group together but are
unintelligible to outsiders. (Restifo and Phelan 2011)
This suggest that weak tacit knowledge is rendered tacit, in
part, because of the limits of discursive abilities of individ-
uals, as Collins (1992) notes:
. . . the general rule is that we know more than we can say, and
that we come to know more than we can say because we learn
by being socialized, not by being instructed.
4. Somatic tacit knowledge
Somatic tacit knowledge or ‘somatic-limit tacit knowledge’
refers to things that our bodies can do which we cannot
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articulate, transfer and replicate as knowledge without the
recipient learning by doing. As Collins (2007) points out, it
relates to the ‘limitations of the human body and brain’.
Here the example of riding a bike or, more speciﬁcally,
balancing a bike becomes appropriate, although any
number of activities from curving a football, catching a
ball or touch typing could be equally valid. Of course,
instructions for all these skills or activities are written
down and articulated in various media and there are tech-
niques employed to aid individuals’ skills in these areas.
Even so, they are not capabilities which can be achieved
from instructions alone, rather they require ‘learning by
doing’ in order to be successfully achieved. As Collins
(2010) notes:
When we ride our bikes we do not self-consciously use
any physical or mechanical models; somehow, with practice
and training, the ability to balance on a bike becomes estab-
lished in our neural pathways and muscles in a ways that
we cannot speak about. We do not learn bicycle riding just
from being told about it . . . or reading about it, but from dem-
onstration, guided instruction, and personal contact with
others who can ride – the modes of teaching associated with
tacit knowledge.
In this context, somatic tacit knowledge is harder to ren-
der explicit than weak tacit knowledge. Indeed, it is
something which often takes place—at least after signiﬁ-
cant practice and experience—without conscious thought
at all. For example, as this paper is being drafted the
authors are able to write text without consciously seeking
the speciﬁc keys that would be pressed to form words,
but rather in an automated manner through touch
typing, not (hopefully) without signiﬁcant thought, but
without conscious selection of the keys pressed to form
the words used.
Although somatic-limit tacit knowledge may at ﬁrst
glance appear far removed from the laboratory setting,
this learning by doing matters in biology, as Nightingale
(2003) has stated:
. . .many forms of memory can only be recalled by doing . . .
and these include many scientiﬁc and technical procedures.
This is illustrated at some length in Vogel’s account of
the process of ‘douncing’ in Wimmer’s high-proﬁle
polio synthesis experiment which was described by one
US Congressional Resolution (Library of Congress
2002) as:
. . . a blueprint that could conceivably enable terrorists to inex-
pensively create human pathogens.
This ‘blueprint’, required the careful preparation of HeLa
cell-free extracts using a Dounce homogenizer (a round
glass pestle that is manually driven into a glass tube) in
order to ‘break the HeLa cells open gently and release the
cytoplasmic extract’. Difﬁculties in the ‘art’ of douncing
identiﬁed by Vogel (2013) through interviews with
researchers working on this experiment are worth
quoting at length:
When you pull on a piston part of the Dounce homogenizerm,
that creates a vacuum, and the cells explode because they
swell . . . If you pull really slowly on that you don’t create
much of a vacuum and so you don’t break the cells very efﬁ-
ciently . . . [but] you can actually pull on the piston part so hard
that you can actually break the bottom out of the Dounce
out . . .There is deﬁnitely some technique in that, in terms of
learning how many strokes do you do and how hard you
pull . . . but that is something that is harder to read from the
text of a paper and really appreciate.
As this example illustrates, public accounts of science can
differ considerably from informal accounts of how science
actually takes place, and these public accounts frequently
conceal the importance of tacit knowledge. One of the
reasons that scientists have difﬁculty in discussing the
role of tacit knowledge could be that reproducibility is
considered a key principle of the scientiﬁc method and
the existence of forms of knowledge that cannot easily be
codiﬁed and replicated sits uncomfortably with this prin-
ciple of reproducibility. This is potentially signiﬁcant for
the way in which advances in S&T are assessed in the
context of the BWC. Relying on accounts of science that
are based purely on publications in journals or in grant
portfolios may conceal important aspects of tacit know-
ledge that are relevant to assessments of how ‘easy’ or
‘accessible’ some of these techniques really are.
Since the 2002 polio synthesis experiment, there have
been a number of advances in techniques that have made
the synthesis of DNA faster, cheaper and easier. For
example, the Gibson Assembly technique, which uses
enzymes to join two or more sequences of DNA that
have overlapping end sequences, is a relatively recent
development in in vitro DNA assembly methods that has
the potential to simplify the construction of large DNA
molecules (Gibson et al. 2009). Yet even this technique,
as in many areas of molecular biology, requires speciﬁc
skills such as using equipment like polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) machines and general ‘good laboratory
practices’ which are typically not evident in published
accounts of scientiﬁc experiments.
The importance of developing speciﬁc mechanical tech-
niques is, of course, not limited to douncing. Many aspects
of life science research require the development of ‘tricky’
mechanical techniques, whether ‘pipetting’ (which requires
using the correct pipetting angle, using the correct immer-
sion depth, pipetting with a constant rhythm, using the
pre-rinsing technique (Mettler-Toledo 2013), cloning the
constructs of adenovirus, micro-injection of neuronal
cultures, or cell lysis (Nadeau 2012). Developments in
high throughput and automated lab capacity could poten-
tially reduce the requirement for human skill, but even the
operation of machinery requires a certain level of tacit
knowledge in order to ensure that the equipment works,
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and works consistently. For example, a member of a syn-
thetic biology research laboratory has repeatedly joked
that their automated pipetting system will not work for
anybody else and that it took him about two years to get
it to work at all.2 Like touch typing or catching a ball,
many such activities require practice to master the tech-
nique and develop the muscle memory necessary to under-
take such activities successfully.
This is particularly evident in some of the experiences
of amateur or ‘DIY’ biologists, who conduct biological ex-
periments as a hobby rather than a profession. The growth
of an amateur biology community has been attributed to
advances in synthetic biology and the de-skilling of tech-
niques such as DNA synthesis, with concerns being ex-
pressed over potential biosecurity implications (Zimmer
2012). However, in practice, the types of projects being con-
ducted by DIY biologists tend to be far less sophisticated
than experiments involving genetic design:
The amateur activity right now is at the seventh- or eighth-grade
level . . .We’re making $10 microscopes and all of the discus-
sion around us is about weaponized anthrax. (Ledford 2010)
While the majority of truly ‘amateur’ activity is at this level,
some DIY biology groups are beginning to conduct signiﬁ-
cantly more sophisticated experimentation that draws
on advances in synthetic biology. For example, members
of BioCurious, a community lab in Silicon Valley, are
seeking crowdsourced funding through Kickstarter to
bioengineer a bioluminescent plant (Pollack 2013).
However, in examples such as this, the individuals
involved are professionally trained scientists working on
a speciﬁc enterprise. The extent to which ‘amateurs’ are,
or could be, involved is therefore questionable.3
Rather, the experiences of the amateur biology commu-
nity serve to illustrate the considerable challenge of
mastering the necessary techniques and skills to perform
even basic biological experiments. For example, the
London Biohacker group, who comprise a mixture of
complete novices and some trained or student biologists,
have noted the challenge of overcoming ‘pipetting errors’
when trying to optimise techniques for DNA extraction
and PCR process (London Hackspace 2013a). MadLab,
a bio group based at the Manchester Digital Laboratory
(2013), experienced similar difﬁculties during their ‘PCR
challenge’, in which they pitched their home-made
Arduino-based PCR machine against the open-source
OpenPCR kit and the commercial PCR at Manchester
Metropolitan University:
. . . the hardest part of the process was getting our samples into
the gel using a micropipette. It turns out there is a bit of an art
to pipetting . . .The more experienced pipettors claimed that it
took them weeks to get the proper technique. (Manchester
Digital Laboratory 2013)
Even the use of equipment for PCR requires a certain level
of learning by doing in order to master the ‘dark art’
(EGlowi Cambridge 2013), and reading a manual alone
is not always sufﬁcient:
After spending some time with the manual I think I have it
ﬁgured out, but it’s deﬁnitely something that’s going to need
training and/or practice to learn to use . . .The interface [of
the thermal cycler] is quite logical and comprehensible when
you’re used to it, but it’s bafﬂingly opaque to ﬁrst-time users!
(London Hackspace 2013b) [emphasis added]
The development of these necessary techniques often
requires guided instruction and practice, something that
is built up over the course of a biologists’ academic
career and is not always readily accessible to an amateur.
This was noted by the 2012 University College London
iGEM (International Genetically Engineered Machine
competition) team who collaborated with the London
Biohacker group to develop a ‘public biobrick’ (a
standardised, interchangeable biological device):
Academics build their knowledge step by step, but a biohacker
may not have that structure of knowledge – they have gaps
here and there, so their knowledge isn’t so well organised . . . I
think the Biohackers gained a lot of experience [from the col-
laboration] in terms of structure because within science, the
steps to achieving a speciﬁc goal can sometimes be very
hazy. (UCL iGEM team 2012)
Heralded as a form of ‘extreme citizen science’, the iGEM
collaboration also provided members of the London
Biohacker group with the opportunity to work in an
academic laboratory and learn the skills and techniques
that their own trial-and-error methods alone could not
provide. This collaboration served as a type of master-
apprentice relationship to promote the transfer of tacit
knowledge from the iGEM team to the amateur biologists.
As was stated by members of the London Biohacker group:
We needed some outside input to improve our techniques
and experiments . . . I was interested in getting a grasp on the
professional techniques, taking [my skills] to the next level.
(UCL iGEM team 2012)
Thus aspects of life science research require the develop-
ment of certain mechanical techniques that, much like
riding a bike, can only be learned through guided instruc-
tion and practice.
5. Communal tacit knowledge
Finally, communal tacit knowledge is the combined know-
ledge that is developed through interaction between experts
with different disciplinary backgrounds working together.
Very few people are likely to have all the skill to master all
the steps needed to do something serious with biological
weapons: rather, serious activities are the product of
teams that integrate different disciplinary expertise.
Communal tacit knowledge can be conceptualised in
two distinct ways. On the one hand, it can be interpreted
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as the bringing together of different disciplinary experts
that are greater than the sum of their parts but, nonethe-
less, can still be separated out into their respective individ-
ual parts. This view emphasises the importance of close
working relationships and the social process of learning
required to ﬁt in a particular community of practice
(McNamara 2001) but implies that communal tacit know-
ledge is simply the addition of different types of expertise
to a community, which operates to achieve a shared goal
(MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). Although this appears to
be a simpliﬁed interpretation, the failure of an organisa-
tion to foster this form of communal tacit knowledge can
hinder the development of the weapons production
process, as demonstrated by the limitations with biological
weapons experienced by the millenialistic Aum Shinrikyo
cult that was responsible for the chemical weapons attack
on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Despite being well
resourced and having signiﬁcant time, the cult categoric-
ally failed with biological weapons, partly because of weak
and somatic-limit tacit knowledge barriers, but also
because:
Aum was obsessed with secrecy . . . the organisation limited its
opportunities by predominantly conﬁning the development of
its biological and chemical programs to the leadership group.
(Danzig et al. 2012)
On the other hand, communal tacit knowledge can be
understood as a form of ‘communally synthesised tacit
knowledge’ (Vogel 2006) that comes from the ongoing
interactions between different types of expertise. In this
sense, these interactions create new forms of knowledge
that become integrated in the community, rather than
residing in particular individuals. This view of communal
tacit knowledge is akin to what Collins (2010) has termed
‘collective tacit knowledge’, that is, the embedded nature
of knowledge in the social and infrastructural environ-
ment. This form of knowledge is located in ‘human
collectivities’ wherein:
. . . the changes in the content of the knowledge belonging to
communities is beyond the control of the individuals within the
communities. (Collins 2007)
Both forms of communal tacit knowledge emphasise
the importance of expert interaction and assimilation of
knowledge at the institutional level, but also raise the
question of the signiﬁcance of communal tacit knowledge
in weapons programmes. As Vogel (2006) argues, these
different conceptualisations of communal tacit knowledge
could have implications for the way in which proliferation
threats are assessed:
Since much of the work carried out at SNOPB was done in a
communal and interactive setting, one could argue that the
tacit knowledge related to 836 [anthrax] was distributed
across its R&D, production, and testing communities . . .
However, if communal tacit knowledge does not degrade
with disruption, or if it can be easily reconstituted from its
individual components, then this has worrisome implications
for proliferation.
In other words, communally synthesised tacit knowledge
would be much more difﬁcult to reconstitute if it was
dependent on the institutional memory of the community,
compared to expertise that is distributed a community of
weapons scientists but could be easily reassembled in
another institutional context. However, even major bio-
weapons programmes require a level of improvisation
and adaptation at an institutional level that might not be
replicable in another context (Leitenberg 2004: 36).
6. The partial erosion of tacit knowledge
The advance of ICT over the last two decades has been
profound in terms of its global reach, but also the amount
and the nature of information available. In terms of global
reach, it has been estimated that world internet usage has
grown by 480.4% over the course of a decade from an
estimated 360,985,492 internet users in December 2000,
to an estimated 2,405,518,376 users in June 2012
(Internet World Stats 2013). This increase is particularly
strong outside of the western world (Royal Society 2011;
Cortada 2013).
There have been parallel changes in the consumption of
data through the internet and as of 2011 one website,
YouTube, consumed the ‘same bandwidth as entire
internet in 2000’ (Meadway 2011). This is coupled with a
change in the nature of ICT and the internet in which there
has been a shift from a passive consumption model (so-
called Web 1.0 model), in which for example users read a
static documents; to the more interactive model
characterised by ‘user-generated content’. This Web 2.0
concept is evident in the emergence of ‘webs of social par-
ticipation’ and interactive websites, such as YouTube,
Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia where users can
actively engage with the content. It has been suggested
that the next step will be Web 3.0, which is:
. . . about representing meanings, connecting knowledge, and
putting these to work in ways that make our experience of
internet more relevant, useful, and enjoyable. (Davis 2008)
Advances in ICT have generated a number of practical
applications, not least in terms of collaboration in
science and the enhancement of knowledge transfer. In
terms of collaborative science, the Royal Society (2011)
has reported that:
. . . over 35% of articles published in international journals are
internationally collaborative, up from 25% 15 years ago.
Several sources attribute the growth in collaboration to the
increasing availability and utility of ICT. Olson et al.
(2008) noted that:
. . . cost-effective and reliable ICTs have made it possible for
scientists to put together more long-distance collaborations
Tacit knowledge and the biological weapons regime . 7 of 14
than ever before. Whereas in the past it would have been
deemed necessary to bring colleagues together in a single la-
boratory, more such partnerships are now conducted at a
distance thanks to technologies such as e-mail, videoconferen-
cing, shared whiteboards, and centralized databases.
The collaborative process generates a number of beneﬁts
for science and scientiﬁc output. The Royal Society report
usefully identiﬁes a number of such beneﬁts. First, it
enables scientists to ‘seek to work with the most outstand-
ing scientists in their ﬁeld’. Secondly, it allows for the
‘beneﬁt of scale’ as the Royal Society (2011) notes:
. . . the International Space Station and the Large Hadron
Collider are instances where the scale or scope of research is
too great for a single nation, even if that nation is scientiﬁcally
advanced.
Thirdly, it allows the burden of research activity to be
shared:
. . . breaking down complex tasks into manageable pieces,
can be invaluable.
Perhaps of greater signiﬁcance is the role collaboration
plays in mobilising scientists around the globe to deal
with a shared global challenge:
In 2002 and 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), presented a very real and immediate epidemic
threat. Over 8,000 people were infected, with over 770
deaths. Within a very short period, clinicians, epidemiologists,
microbiologists and many others had joined the international
effort. This was a global public health emergency, for which
large scale global commitment and collaborative research were
essential, to ensure a rapid and effective response. The global
challenges of the 21st century look to be drawing researchers
together to combat broad issues, which require a collaborative
approach. (Royal Society 2011)
In this context, the advance of ICT cannot and should not
be stopped or stymied any time soon given the range of
expectations pinned on the internet and the clear beneﬁts
derived from ICT. As much has been stated in the
Deauville G8 Declaration (G8 Summit 2011), which
suggests the internet is ‘a major driver for the global
economy, its growth and innovation’. Yet ICT and the
internet can be seen as a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, advances in ICT and the growth of internet
usage are likely to bring tremendous beneﬁts, not least to
the process of scientiﬁc collaboration. Yet on the other
hand, the convergence of ICT, particularly with biology,
has the potential to generate a number of new ethical, legal
and social challenges, including in the sphere of the CBW
regimes and weapons knowledge.
First, advances in ICT have the potential to ‘unlock the
master’s secrets’, or at least make these easier to discover.
Despite some initial scepticism regarding ICT and the
transfer of types of tacit knowledge, more recently, some
academics have suggested changes in ICT will make the
exchange of tacit knowledge possible. Certainly, Foray
and Steinmueller (2003) have suggested that:
. . . the next generations of ICTs will enable efﬁcient storage
and long distance transfer of a greater variety of knowledge
(including knowledge that has previously been regarded as
‘inherently tacit’).
Whereas Hildrum (2009) has posited that:
advanced e-learning systems—particularly remote
laboratories—make possible efﬁcient sharing of tacit know-
ledge between internationally dispersed technicians.
However, successful knowledge-sharing depends crucially
on the degree to which the users are motivated to acquire
new knowledge online
Scientiﬁc websites, such as the Journal of Visualised
Experimentation (JoVE) enable actors to follow the
methods and techniques used in experiments systematic-
ally, using visual demonstrations of the protocols
and processes employed. Journal of Visualised
Experimentation (2013a), which is a ‘peer reviewed,
PubMed-indexed video journal’, contains more than
2,000 video protocols on a number of different experi-
ments, and purports to address:
. . . two of the biggest challenges faced by today’s life science
research community: i) low transparency and poor reproduci-
bility of biological experiments and ii) time and labor-intensive
nature of learning new experimental techniques.
Indeed, testimonials (such as those given below) and
further discussion with those that use this open access
internet tool indicate the website variously serves to aid
the learning process, save time and money and reduce
the trial-and-error process required to replicate results.
. I have not yet used the mouse olfactory recording
video you allowed me to download today, but I have
used links to other JoVE videos on several other occa-
sions. I ﬁnd them to be very effective ways to commu-
nicate different concepts to students - a picture may be
worth a 1000 words, the videos save me millions.
. You can’t ﬁgure out how to do this stuff just from
reading the literature, you have to have somebody
show you . . . this is amazing!
. By having the video protocol . . . as the ones in the
Journal of Visualized Experiments, anybody can
quickly learn the technique whenever it is convenient
for her/him saving them lots of time, money and
frustrations.
. Thank you for your wonderful website; we just used it
at this lab and you saved us hours of trial and error!!
(Journal of Visualised Experimentation 2013b).
In this context, internet tools, such as the Journal of
Visualised Experimentation, which visualise the methods
employed in the experiment, can be seen as a new means
of laboratory sharing and exchange which, perhaps under
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certain conditions enable the transfer of certain aspects
of tacit knowledge but particularly the categories
identiﬁed by Collins (2010) and others, as ‘mismatched
saliences’, ‘hidden knowledge’ and ‘ostensive knowledge’.
They can do this precisely because visualised experimenta-
tion facilitates the more complete transfer of knowledge
in circumstances that require you have somebody to
show you.
There is, however, a need for caution in overstating the
implications of tacit knowledge transfer through visualisa-
tion and the process of viewing only gets you so far. First,
because video protocols only reveal as much as the editors
deem necessary, it is possible that some information is lost
in the editing process, not least because completely follow-
ing every single step in the process would make a rather
boring video. Secondly, while visualised experimentation
may aid knowledge transfer, it does not aid the develop-
ment of somatic-limit tacit knowledge and researchers are
still required to develop the physical skills and muscle
memory required to execute certain actions: watching an
Eric Clapton guitar solo, for example, still leaves most
viewers a frustrating distance from being able to replicate
such a solo. Thirdly, in relation to biological weapons,
there are no available video protocols (at least publicly
in the open-source literature) which go through all the
processes required to develop a serious biological
weapon. Sections of different visualised experiment may
help achieve certain tasks, but it would require a great
deal of dedicated effort to identify and assimilate all the
necessary steps required to do something serious, a factor
which may drive aspiring bioweaponeers in search of
other, more conventional, options.
Thirdly, yet related to the point above, while somatic
tacit knowledge remains difﬁcult to transfer, this may be
rendered less important as biology becomes more predict-
able and better understood through a process of ‘digitisa-
tion’ and the purported transition of biology into a
predictive, engineering discipline. As the website of the
Craig Venter Institute (2010) notes:
Sequencing genomes has now become routine, giving rise to
thousands of genomes in the public databases. In essence,
scientists are digitising biology by converting the A, C, T,
and G’s of the chemical makeup of DNA into 1’s and 0’s in
a computer.
Synthesis techniques have the potential to enable the
reverse; that is the conversion of digitised data into the
A, C, T, and G’s of the chemical makeup of DNA. New
enabling technologies are argued to make this process
easier to the extent that it has been suggested that DNA
synthesis is now ‘equivalent to operating an espresso
machine’ with the process of ‘ligating base pairs’ described
as being ‘as easy as making a milkshake’ (Workshop
Discussion 2012).4
Such claims, which emanate from experienced labora-
tory professionals, remain contested and ‘easy’ remains a
relative term, as one interview participant in a Harvard
Sussex Program project on the future of the S&T reviewing
process in the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
(BWC) pointed out:
. . . people who say things are easy often come from labs, have
support and if required can go and ask others. (Participant 28)
Indeed, the ease through which individuals can synthesise
life remains contested and certainly scratching beneath the
headlines of various synthetic biology success stories
suggest the process of engineering biology remains more
complex and costly than sometimes presented in scientiﬁc
publications (Kwok 2010; Voosen 2013). This is not to
belittle the potential of emerging ﬁelds like synthetic
genomics, nor is it to dismiss the signiﬁcance of emerging
platform technologies, but rather to inject a note of
caution and draw attention to the complexity that
frequently lies behind the gloss. Moreover, synthesis of a
potential agent is a far cry from weaponisation, and there
is perhaps a need for caution in conﬂating the acquisition
of strands of DNA with the acquisition of a weapon. As
Vogel (2012) has stated:
. . . the way science is done – its troublesome, contingent, and
messy means of production – often differs from the clean and
orderly public representations of scientiﬁc work codiﬁed in
scientiﬁc publications and other written accounts.
Despite the hidden complexities in doing science, the
human race has a history of innovation and once the
pace of innovation begins to gather momentum,
technologies can evolve in spectacular fashion under
certain circumstances (Rogers 2002), something evident
in the evolution of ICT and the home computer
(Cortada 2013). Moreover, one only has to look at the
achievements of undergraduate biologists competing in
iGEM to see how ‘people are resourceful and work to
solve problems and constraints’ (Participant 43). In this
regard, concepts such as ‘biobricks’ may become particu-
larly important over the coming decades. Although syn-
thetic biologists are still struggling to develop the requisite
interoperability and reliability of standardised parts, the
pace of progress suggests these could become a very real
prospect in the coming decades. This could result in a
‘game changer’ that would simplify aspects of biology
and moves the life sciences away from trial-and-error to
rational design and engineering approaches, at the same
time placing biology in the hands of mathematicians, en-
gineers and computer experts rather than experienced
biologists, potentially reinventing the discipline and
practise of biology. This is not that same as the erosion
of the somatic skills required for success in biology. Nor
does the ability to design pathogens necessarily entail the
ability to animate, culture, stabilise and weaponise patho-
gens. Yet it does perhaps suggest that some of the somatic
tacit knowledge required in research in biotechnology
could be less important in the future.
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7. So what: implications for the BWC regime
Under Article XII of the BWC, it has become established
practice to conduct a quinquennial review of the
Convention which takes:
. . . into account any new scientiﬁc and technological develop-
ments relevant to the Convention.
This process of monitoring developments in S&T and
‘tending’ to the BWC is important, as advances in S&T—
along with a number of other factors—have the capacity to
undermine (or reinforce) the norm embodied in the BWC.
Advances in science which, for example, could increase the
capacity of individuals to create and control biology may
enhance the utility—and by implication the appeal—of
biological weapons thereby undermining the norm. As the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1973)
noted:
The more a proscribed weapon gains in military attractiveness,
the more likely is its proscription to be ignored.
In contrast, advances in detection technologies could
contribute to the process of investigating alleged violations
and thus reinforce the norm or could be used for identify-
ing potential threats in a more rapid and effective manner.
With a number of other means whereby S&T can inﬂu-
ence the BWC, the process of reviewing and responding to
developments in S&T of relevance to the BWC is import-
ant. However, historically developments in S&T have been
marginalised in the review conference process and there is
little evidence of substantive discussion on this topic
beyond debate on whether or not to include lists under
the additional understanding agreed under Article I. This
deﬁcit has led some States Parties and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to question whether the established
practice of reviewing S&T remains ﬁt for purpose. Certainly
in the run up to the Seventh Review Conference in 2011,
longstanding calls from NGOs and States Parties to do
something about the process of reviewing S&T intensiﬁed,
with proposals from countries as diverse as:
. . .Australia, Japan and New Zealand; India, the UK, the US,
South Africa and China, as well as in meetings, such as the
Wilton Park Clingendael workshop in September 2011. (Revill
et al. 2011)
In an effort to rectify some of the limitations in the quin-
quennial S&T review process, the Seventh Review
Conference established a SAI on review of developments
in the ﬁeld of S&T in order to formally inject an S&T
component in the intersessional discussions. The purpose
of the S&T SAI is ‘to discuss, and promote common
understanding and effective action’ on the following on
an annual basis (Biological Weapons Convention 2012):
. new S&T developments that have potential for uses
contrary to the provisions of the Convention
. new S&T developments that have potential beneﬁts for
the Convention, including those of special relevance to
disease surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation
. possible measures for strengthening national biological
risk management, as appropriate, in research and
development involving new S&T developments of
relevance to the Convention
. voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to
encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia
and industry
. education and awareness-raising about risks and
beneﬁts of life sciences and biotechnology
. S&T-related developments relevant to the activities of
multilateral organisations such as the World Health
Organization, the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization,
the International Plant Protection Convention and
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
. any other S&T developments of relevance to the BWC
With additional topics identiﬁed for each year, there is
potential within this agenda item to generate an ongoing
process of review and to ‘ﬁll a perennial lacuna in scientiﬁc
discussion under the Convention’. However, a number of
challenges remain in maximising the potential, including
overcoming the limited time available for discussion (ef-
fectively 45 minutes per sub-agenda item) and the limited
resources available to the Implementation Support Unit
(ISU) (Revill 2012). Moreover, to date the outcome of
the intersessional processes has been disappointing, with
some useful discussion but limited promotion of common
understandings and even less effective action.
Beyond these procedural challenges a much deeper issue
is the apparent limitations in understandings of S&T
among delegations to the BWC. This is perhaps not
surprising; many individuals on delegations to the BWC
in Geneva remain so-called ‘generalists’ on comparatively
short-term postings and, in many cases, covering several
very different issue areas. As Johnson (1998) has noted:
As ambassadors and their staff are subject to rotation every
3–5 years, and most foreign ministers work on the principle of
diplomats as non-specialists, the likelihood of a signiﬁcant
proportion of ineffective representatives being engaged in the
multilateral forum is high.
The limitations in scientiﬁc capacity mean that expect-
ations of the extent of scientiﬁc discussion possible in
the two or three weeks of a review conference process—
or 45 minutes of an intersessional meeting—needs to be
tempered. As one interview participant mused:
. . . some policy people have some technical training but if the
challenge is to understand the science and have a scientiﬁc
conversation is that enough? (Participants 33).
This factor, on the one hand, further dampens expectations
of what can be achieved in the process of reviewing S&T
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within the BWC, something compounded by reluctance on
the part of some states to get into detail on S&T in the BWC
because of security concerns. On the other hand, it perhaps
underlines the importance of bringing an understanding not
just of the substance in relation to advances in science but
also the process of research and its ‘doability’. If things
really are getting ‘easier’ and:
. . . the availability of web-based technologies is facilitating the
transfer of tacit knowledge through the creation of worldwide
formal or informal learning communities or partnerships.
(National Research Council 2011)
There may then be requirements to ‘tend’ to the regime ac-
cordingly in order to ensure its continued suitability. In
other words, if states are going to do S&T in the context
of the Convention, then they need to address not just the
‘recipes’ and the availability of ingredients and equipment,
but also the contingent and complex process of cooking, and
thereby pay heed to the sociotechnical dimension in which
biotechnology evolves. Thus there is a need to look at how:
. . . technologies emerge within social, natural, economic, and
political contexts. (Vogel 2013)
This is not to suggest that tacit knowledge has been
entirely ignored in the process of reviewing S&T of rele-
vance to the BWC. Drawing on a workshop in Beijing
hosted by the Inter-Academy Panel, section II of the
2011 background material which was produced by the
ISU (Implementation Support Unit 2011), stated:
Although ﬁrst class research continues to rely heavily upon
tacit knowledge, the availability of web-based technologies is
facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge through the cre-
ation of worldwide formal or informal learning communities
or partnerships . . .The report notes a number of current
examples, and also suggests that an area for future in-depth
analysis is the changing nature of tacit knowledge, of which
intangible technology is a subset, as kits and other resources
make it easier for less skilled individuals to carry out work that
once required signiﬁcant training.
Yet there is little evidence of this issue being raised within
the Review Conference (or since) and given the signiﬁcance
of tacit knowledge in understanding the threat posed by
biological weapons, this topic surely warrants further
attention because of its potential to: undermine our under-
standing of biological weapons programmes, generate
distorted perceptions of the threat posed by dual-use bio-
technology in the 21st century, and generate a myopic
focus in the process of reviewing S&T. As Ouagrham-
Gormley (2012) has stated:
To more accurately identify the nature and evaluate the pace
and scope of future proliferation threats, and consequently
develop more efﬁcient nonproliferation and counterpro-
liferation policies, scholars and policymakers must include
the intangible dimension of proliferation in their assessments.
They must also understand the factors that determine the
mechanisms and the conditions under which scientiﬁc data
and knowledge can be efﬁciently exploited.
Indeed, the role of tacit knowledge and its potential partial
erosion suggests that the area of know-how warrants
broader and deeper attention by delegations in reviews of
S&T, particularly if, as has been suggested by some, these
developments in S&T have the potential to become ‘game
changers’. As Carlson (2011) put it more bluntly:
If it were easy to write pathogen genomes . . . from scratch, we
would quite frankly be in deep shit.
Greater attention to the role of tacit knowledge and the
sociotechnical dimensions of S&T—that is, the recognition
of the socially embedded nature of technology—could help
to unpack concepts such as ‘game changers’ when used in
the context of biosecurity concerns.
In order to progress in this area one ﬁrst step is surely
building a greater understanding of what tacit knowledge is
and how it is acquired in the life science context. A second
step is to work out, through sociotechnical discussion, the
extent to which this form of knowledge matters and how
easy ‘easy’ is in relation to certain key activities. There is
surely a signiﬁcant role for academics, NGOs and learned
societies, such as the National Academies or the Inter-
Academy Panel’s Biosecurity Working Group, working in
conjunction with those in the security forces, intelligence
agencies and disarmament specialist in this interdisciplinary
process. Speciﬁcally, such interested parties could address
the difﬁculty involved in, for example, the weaponisation
process of biological weapons or the creation of functioning
organism through synthetic components. Related to the
above it could be useful to look at the extent to which
new enabling technologies reduce the tacit knowledge
‘barriers to bioweapons’, ‘or whether they require the
development of new skills’ (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012).
Realistically, there are limitations as to what can be
raised in fora such as the BWC and it remains unlikely
that a detailed, useful and open exchange on tacit know-
ledge barriers to biological weapons could take place
between the 170-odd state parties to the BWC, not least
because of national security sensitivities of such a discus-
sion. However, sociotechnical discussion on the assembly of
synthetic organisms could provide a less sensitive yet useful
route to generating a greater understanding of whether and
how tacit knowledge matters. Alternatively, this is some-
thing that could be dealt with in depth among a smaller
collective of actors who could begin a process of building
a more signiﬁcant understanding of the complex reality of
the scientiﬁc research process, which could be presented
within the BWC forum. Such steps could go some length
to advancing thinking about S&T in amoremeaningful way
and counter oversimpliﬁed understandings of the process of
research which neglect the social factors that are involved
in, and inﬂuence, developments in S&T generally, and bio-
logical weapons speciﬁcally.
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Notes
1. The original three-way classiﬁcation developed by
Collins is based around three categories: ‘relational
tacit knowledge’; ‘somatic tacit knowledge’ and ‘col-
lective tacit knowledge’ (Collins 2010).
2. Based on evidence from author’s participant observa-
tion over several months in a synthetic biology
research laboratory at the Centre for Synthetic
Biology and Innovation, Imperial College London.
3. In the case of BioCurious (2012), while community
projects are open to anyone, participation in projects
that involve considerably more wetlab work is only
open to members who have taken safety training.
4. Statement by participant and a workshop held under
Chatham House rules hosted by the University of
Bath on 8–9 November 2012 as part of the UK FCO
Strategic Programme (grant number: SPF 000211).
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